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ABSTRACT 
 
Long-Term Impact of Youth Minimum Wages: 
Evidence from Two Decades of Individual Longitudinal Data*
 
This paper quantifies the long-run impact of exposure to youth minimum wages and sheds 
light on its mechanisms. It uses remarkable longitudinal data spanning for twenty years and 
explores legislative changes that define groups of teenagers exposed for different durations. 
After controlling for the contemporaneous impact of the minimum wage, its long-run impact 
translates into: an overall wage premium, consistent with an upgrading in the quality of jobs 
offered; a flatter tenure-earnings profile, consistent with lower initial investment in firm-
specific training. Interestingly, the overall wage premium increases with exposure and the 
tenure-earnings profile is flatter the longer the exposure. 
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1 Introduction
Little is known about the impact of exposure to minimum wages at young ages
on long-term labor market outcomes and contradictory hypotheses have been put
forth. On one hand, human capital theory predicts that firms will reduce invest-
ment in training after an increase in the minimum wage, since it prevents workers
from taking wage cuts necessary to fund training. Also, school enrollment could
decline, as teenagers would drop out of school to start working. On the contrary,
the minimum wage legislation could lead employers into offering better quality
jobs and workers could increase their investment in skill acquisition, if that were
perceived as a requirement to access jobs. Additionally, if minimum wages in-
crease the likelihood of unemployment, they will worsen career prospects for the
affected workers, whereas if they raise job attachment and increase employment,
they will contribute to improve longer-term career outcomes. The empirical litera-
ture testing the long-term impact of minimum wages is restricted to Neumark and
Nizalova (2007), who have conducted their analysis at a very aggregate level (cells
defined by state-year-age) and computed exposure to minimum wages as the aver-
age minimum wage to which individuals in each cell would have been entitled at
earlier ages, if they had been in the labor market in the state of current residence.
Also, they have not attempted to shed light on the mechanisms that may drive
the impact of minimum wages, focusing only on the quantification of the overall
impact.
The first aim of this paper is therefore to quantify the impact of exposure to
high youth minimum wages on long-term outcomes, using a dataset that tracks
the worker’s actual employment and wage history since early ages, spanning for
almost two decades with coverage of the population of workers and firms in the
private sector of a European Union economy, Portugal. The first question to be
addressed is: How does exposure to high minimum wages at young ages affect
long-term worker’s wages?
In the vein of Neumark and Nizalova (2007), potential exposure to minimum
wages will first be considered, by taking into account just the worker’s age at
different points in time and the level of the minimum wage that was then enforced,
disregarding at an initial stage of the analysis whether the worker was actually
already in the labor market or not.
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The subsequent steps extend the analysis into several dimensions. In the next
step, actual exposure to minimum wages is distinguished from potential exposure.
Instead of simply reflecting eligibility to earn the minimum wage, actual exposure
takes into account the worker’s age and time of entry into the labor market; as
such, exposure to a particular level of the minimum wage is considered to have
taken place only if the individual had already joined the labor market. Still in the
vein of Neumark and Nizalova, up to this point the analysis does not explore the
mechanisms that may drive the impact of the minimum wage, as it does not control
for productivity-related variables. In particular, the role played by education is
absent from the picture, so as to capture the full impact of the minimum wage,
whichever channel of operation.
The second aim of the analysis is precisely to shed some light on the mechanisms
through which the minimum wage may operate. Two specific hypotheses will be
tested: i) according to human capital theory, as stated in particular by Becker
(1993, first published 1964) and Hashimoto (1982), firms will reduce on-the-job
training following an increase in the minimum wage, with a negative impact on
the worker’s human capital accumulation and future wage profile; ii) on the con-
trary, according to more recent theories that allow for labor market imperfections,
such as that developed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), firms will increase the
provision of on-the-job general training following an increase in the minimum wage.
I hypothesize that this will lead to an overall wage premium, comparable to an
upgrading in the quality of jobs offered. The tests will be performed while con-
trolling for another potential mechanism of operation of youth minimum wages:
its impact on schooling.
To accomplish these aims, I rely on two sets of remarkable conditions. First
of all, I exploit a sharp change in the legislation that took place in mid-80’s,
which raised minimum wages by 50% for some youth age levels and by 33% for
other youth age levels, enabling a clear definition of groups of workers who have
been exposed to high minimum wages at different ages and for different durations.
Part of these legislative changes have been analyzed in a different setting, i.e. to
check the short-run employment impact of minimum wages (Pereira, 2003) and
its impact on worker flows and firms’ recruitment and dismissal policies (Portugal
and Cardoso, 2006).
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Secondly, I rely on a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset of un-
usual quality, which follows from 1987 to 2005 the population of firms with wage-
earners in the private sector, as well as the population of its workers. Therefore,
problems commonly faced by panel datasets, such as panel attrition and over- or
under-sampling of certain groups, are avoided. Moreover, the legal requirement for
the data to be posted in a public space inside the firm contributes to its reliability,
reducing measurement errors.
Section 2 explores the mechanisms that may lead youth minimum wages to
have a long-term impact on wages. Section 3 clarifies the institutional setting and
section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides evidence on teenage wage trends
under changing minimum wages, highlighting the remarkable impact that the leg-
islative changes had on the wage distribution. Section 6 describes the empirical
model and discusses its results. Concluding comments are presented in section 7.
2 Why would exposure to high youth minimum wages im-
pact long-term wages?
Three mechanisms that influence human capital accumulation have been pointed
out in the literature as triggering an impact of youth minimum wages on workers’
long-term wage profiles: on the-job-training, schooling, and the employment /
unemployment channel. This section clarifies how each of these mechanisms is
considered in the current analysis.
Becker’s analysis of human capital formation provides the framework on the im-
pact of on-the-job training on wages in competitive markets (Becker, 1993: 30-51,
first published 1964) and Hashimoto (1982) extended this type of setting to ex-
plicitly handle the influence of youth minimum wages on long-term wages. Under
the human capital general setting, on-the-job training raises the future earnings
capacity of the worker, while being subject to a current cost, associated with the
materials consumed, equipment used, instructors’ time and the trainees opportu-
nity cost of time spent in training (foregone production). Since the worker reaps
the benefits of training in the form of higher future earnings, the firm has no in-
centive to provide training, unless it can make the worker bear its cost, in the
form of a lower current wage. In general, a profit-maximizing firm will therefore
make the worker fully pay for general training (which results in skills that are val-
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ued throughout the labor market), while it will accept to pay for part of the cost
of firm-specific training (which results in skills that are of value only to the firm
concerned). The current wage of a trainee would therefore equal his/her potential
productivity, deducted of the cost of training. A clear prediction follows: wage
growth should be faster for workers who receive on-the-job training, compared to
those who do not.
Similarly, in Hashimoto’s (1982) model the worker’s current wage equals the
value of the worker’s marginal productivity net of the cost of training. An in-
crease in the amount of training offered could take place at the expense of a lower
current wage, in a compensating differentials type of argument, since both mone-
tary returns and training would be part of the compensation package; conversely,
for the same level of training, an increase in wage mandated by the legislation
would lead to a reduction in the quantity of labor demanded by the firm (while
leading to an increase in the quantity of labor supplied). Job competition would,
as a result, put downward pressure on the training provided, thus increasing de-
mand and reducing supply of labor. A new equilibrium would be established, with
lower on-the-job training.1 The general setting of human capital theory therefore
predicts that firms will reduce investment in on-the-job training after an increase
in the minimum wage, since it prevents workers from taking wage cuts necessary
to fund training.
A different set of models allow for market imperfections, in which case the role of
general training is crucial. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) explicitly consider labor
market frictions that compress the distribution of wages relative to the distribution
of productivities. Such frictions include collective bargaining wage floors, national
minimum wages, asymmetric information between current and prospective em-
ployer, or job search and other mobility costs. Under any of these mechanisms,
the outside wage option of an employed worker is lower than her productivity.2 For
example, the worker may have to incur a mobility cost, such that, even if she were
paid her marginal product in the new firm, the net benefit would be lower; the
possibility of an intervening period of unemployment also lowers the net benefit
from job changing; prospective employers cannot fully observe the worker’s skill
(even if it results from general training) and therefore the wage offer may not fully
1And an ambiguous effect on the level of employment, which would depend on the change in training costs as
the amount of training declines.
2Which is common across firms, given that all training is general.
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reflect it. Any of these frictions gives the current employer some monopsony power,
i.e. the ability to pay the worker a wage below her marginal productivity, as it
takes into account the worker outside option.3 Moreover, most of these frictions
mean that the rents the firm extracts from skilled workers are larger than those it
extracts from the unskilled —if the cost of unemployment is larger for the skilled,
in particular when the unemployment benefit system is progressive; when higher
skills are harder to observe by prospective employers; or when minimum wages are
enforced. Therefore, training will raise the productivity of the worker more than
it raises her wage and this power to extract rents from the worker, in particular
from skilled workers, drives the firm willingness to invest in general skills. Stated
intuitively, if the firm provides training the worker’s productivity will increase but,
given the compression of the wage distribution, the firm does not have to fully pay
the worker for the productivity improvement. Since it keeps some of the surplus,
even when wages increase the firm is willing to keep the worker and it will in-
crease investment in general human capital, so as to increase the level of surplus
it obtains. “[A]s the wage structure becomes more compressed, firms pay for a
larger fraction of the costs of general training, and when the structure of wages
is sufficiently distorted, they may pay for all the costs.” (Acemoglu and Pischke,
1999: 541) In other words, firms would upgrade the general skills of its workers
and the type of jobs they offer.
Stevens (1994) makes a related claim that, depending on the market structure
where wages are determined, firms can appropriate a part of the returns to train-
ing and will as such have an interest in investing in the worker’s human capital.
Moreover, according to her model, training itself may have an impact reducing
competition, as it can increase differentiation among firms and among workers.
Manning (2003) provides a thorough discussion of the provision of firm general
and specific training in labor markets with frictions, showing that in general firms
will be willing to provide and pay for training. Booth and Zoega (2004) call atten-
tion to the fact that the wage compression required for the result by Acemoglu and
Pischke to hold occurs in situations that are much more general than the common
interpretation of the authors’ terminology “wage compression” would lead us to
think. They underline that firms would be willing to invest in the general hu-
man capital of the worker even in settings such as piece-rate payment, usually
3Assuming the firm has some bargaining power.
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associated with competitive wages and no market distortions.
This reasoning of “upgrading the quality of jobs” or “high wage strategy” is
often implicit in the aims of policy makers, when claiming that minimum wages
will raise the living standards of the low paid while contributing to develop general
skills.
Two testable implications therefore follow from human capital models and more
recent models of labor market imperfections. First of all, if the minimum wage
reduces the provision of firm-specific training, the tenure-earnings profile would
be flatter for workers exposed to youth minimum wages. These lower returns
to seniority within the firm would be a direct consequence of the lower amount
of human capital specific to the firm embodied in the worker. Secondly, if the
minimum wage raises investment in general training, with firms adopting more
of a job upgrading strategy, we should observe a positive impact of exposure to
youth minimum wages, which could take the form of an overall wage premium
for exposed workers or a steeper experience-earnings profile. This study aims at
testing these two hypotheses.
Empirically, the impact of minimum wages on on-the-job training has been
tested by using either direct information on training undertaken by the worker or
indirect evidence on wage progression for short periods of one to three years, yield-
ing mixed results (for recent evidence using information on training, see Neumark
and Wascher (2001), Fairris and Pedace (2004) and Arulampalam et al (2004), and
for studies based on wage growth see Hashimoto (1982), Grossberg and Sicilian
(1999), Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) and Simpson (1984)).
The second mechanism linking minimum wages to human capital formation is
investment in formal schooling. Workers may increase their investment in school-
ing, so as to raise their productivity and compete for jobs (Cahuc and Michel,
1996), to avoid employment in a secondary sector where no minimum wage is en-
forced (Agell and Lommerud, 1997), or to compensate for the decline in wages due
to the reduction of on-the-job training (Ravn and Sorensen, 1999).4 The empirical
specifications in the current work will control for the impact of schooling on wages
when testing for the long-term impact of minimum wages, remaining agnostic as
to the impact of the minimum wage on schooling. Given the general trend in the
4The empirical results on this are mixed (see Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), Campolieti et al (2005), Turner
and Demiralp (2001), Neumark and Wascher (1995, 1996) and Hyslop and Stillman (2007)).
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economy towards an increase in the level of schooling, younger cohorts (precisely
those more affected by high youth minimum wages) have higher schooling levels
and no causal link can be established on whether that was partly driven by the
minimum wage or, on the contrary, in its absence, the increase in the schooling
level of younger cohorts would have been even more pronounced.
One third mechanism could operate to influence the wage profile of workers
affected by minimum wages when young: the employment channel. I rely on
Portugal and Cardoso’s (2006) results, who found that in the specific setting of
the country under analysis and these legislative changes, the minimum wage did
not have a detrimental impact on employment, due to the increased job attachment
it generated on youth already in employment, which compensated for the negative
demand side impact predicted by human capital theory. For this reason I avoid
exploring again here the impact of minimum wages on employment.
3 Institutional setting: minimum wage, compulsory edu-
cation and working age
A mandatory national minimum wage was introduced in Portugal in 1974, covering
workers aged 20 or older and excluding agriculture and household services. Ever
since, it has been annually updated by the parliament, under government pro-
posal.5 Decisions on the level of the minimum wage are taken on a discretionary
basis, usually taking into account past and predicted inflation and a consultation
with employers and workers representatives. It is defined as monthly earnings and
each year any mandated changes take effect in January.
Since it was first enacted, the minimum wage has undergone several changes
concerning its age coverage, summarized in table 1.
Age Group
Year 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 or older
1979 to 1986 50 50 50 50 75 75 100
1987 50 50 50 75 100 100 100
1988 75 75 75 75 100 100 100
Table 1: Share of the general minimum wage enforced, according to the age of
the worker (%) Source: Portugal, Dia´rio da Repu´blica, several issues.
Three changes in the legislation are worth highlighting:
5The only exceptions were 1982, when it was not updated, and 1989, when it was updated twice.
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• in 1987 the minimum wage for workers aged 17 increased by 50 percent due
to changes in the legislation ceteris paribus, as it was raised from half to 75
percent of the full minimum wage;
• also in 1987, the minimum wage for workers aged 18 or 19 was raised from 75
percent of the minimum wage to the full minimum, therefore increasing by
33 percent;
• in 1988, the minimum wage for workers aged 14 to 16 was raised from 50
percent to 75 percent of the full minimum, thus increasing by 50 percent.
Following these legislative changes, different groups of teenagers were poten-
tially exposed to a high youth minimum wage at different ages and for different
durations. It is particularly enlightening to consider the worker age as of 1987:
individuals then aged 20 or older were never exposed to high youth minimum
wages, while those aged 14 (and therefore old enough to work under the legislation
enforced at the time), were eligible to five years of high youth minimum wages,
with the whole range of potential exposure for ages in-between. Table 2 makes
this point more explicit.
potent. expos.
year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ... 2005 to high youth
min w (years)
age 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ... 32 5
(in bold 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... 33 4
if eligible 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ... 34 3
to high 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ... 35 3
youth 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ... 36 2
minimum 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ... 37 1
wage) 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ... 38 0
Table 2: Eligibility (potential exposure) to high youth minimum wages
Actual exposure to high youth minimum wages, however, must take into account
the year the worker joined the labor market and his/her age at the time. Table
3 clarifies the number of years of actual exposure to high youth minimum wages,
based on age and year of entry into the labor market.
Compulsory education used to be in Portugal 6 years, until it was set at 9 years
for students entering in 1987 their first year of primary education.6 In other words,
by 1996 the compulsory schooling level was raised to 9 years, and the age at which
6Law 46/86.
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year of entry 1987 1993
into lab. market or earlier 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 or later
age, 14 5 5 4 3 2 1 0
as of 15 4 4 3 2 1 0 0
March 1987 16 3 3 2 1 0 0 0
17 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
18 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Number of years of actual exposure to high youth minimum wages. Note:
The reference month of March was chosen simply because it was the reference month for data collection.
compulsory education finishes set at 15 years old.
Until 1992 the legal minimum age to work was 14 years old7; as of January
1992 it was raised to 15 years and from January 1997 onwards it was raised to
16 years8, in accordance with the legislation that set compulsory education at 9
years of schooling and until the age of 15. Individuals aged 15 who have completed
compulsory education can perform “light work”, whereas those aged 15 who have
not yet completed compulsory education can only perform work related to training
that will not jeopardize completion of compulsory education.
4 Dataset and definition of concepts
The analysis relies on administrative longitudinal data on workers and their firms
(Quadros de Pessoal), gathered annually by the Ministry of Employment in an
inquiry that every firm with wage earners is legally obliged to fill in. Information
on all the personnel working for the firm in a reference week (in March until 1993
and in October since 1994) is reported. The personnel on short leave (such as
sickness, maternity, strike or holidays) is included, whereas personnel on long-
term leave (such as military service) is not reported. Public administration and
domestic service are not covered and the coverage of agriculture is low, given its
low share of wage earners. For the remaining sectors, the mandatory nature of the
survey leads to an extremely high response rate, and in practice the population of
wage earners in manufacturing and the services private sector is covered. Reported
data on the worker include gender, age, schooling, occupation, seniority within the
firm, monthly earnings (split into several components), and duration of work.9 The
7Decree-law 49.408 of 1969.
8Decree-law 396/91 and law 46/86.
9The database also includes information on the employer, such as the industry, location, size, gross revenue,
and origin of capital (private national, foreign, or public).
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data cover a long period of almost twenty years and information from 1987 to 2005
are used.10
A worker identification code, based on a transformation of the social security
number, enables tracking him/her over time. Extensive checks have been per-
formed to guarantee the accuracy of the longitudinal data, using the variables
gender, date of birth, highest schooling level achieved, and worker identification
code (see appendix A for further details).
For this study, workers aged 14 to 20 years as of March 1987 are tracked over
the whole period 1987 to 2005.11 Note that all workers ever observed in the data
set who fulfill that requirement are kept for analysis, irrespective of whether they
were actually observed working in 1987, therefore capturing the whole cohort. By
2005, the latest year under analysis, these workers were aged 32 to 38 years.12 This
resulted in 6,368,256 observations on 1,134,356 workers. Table 4 shows the size of
this population, by year and observed age.
10No worker data is available for 1990 and 2001.
11The March cutoff month was chosen simply because it was the reference month for the data collection until
1993.
12Given that the reference month changed from March to October, a share of the workers will by 2005 be 39
years old.
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obs. March March March March March March Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct Oct
age 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005
14 1,009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 5,281 6,227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 10,154 11,838 14,402 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 15,469 16,979 20,422 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 20,834 22,146 25,277 29,143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 25,911 26,965 30,228 34,213 35,873 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 28,560 29,683 32,854 37,513 39,280 38,714 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 30,602 33,399 37,568 39,328 40,598 18,524 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 39,378 42,326 44,518 44,369 46,821 20,709 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 47,516 48,689 48,102 50,255 51,681 21,995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 50,029 51,592 50,507 50,483 54,750 54,676 24,760 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 53,407 52,439 53,443 54,443 56,853 60,966 26,331 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 53,793 55,115 56,611 55,470 62,081 64,226 28,707 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 56,083 57,329 57,053 59,747 64,663 68,783 30,117 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,784 57,679 57,407 60,613 61,423 68,756 71,743 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,677 57,492 60,151 61,621 64,554 71,589 32,257 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,597 60,050 61,282 64,488 66,832 76,576 32,966 0 0
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34,718 60,440 63,863 66,418 75,612 77,657 33,455 0
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35,174 62,984 65,725 70,801 76,560 78,682 35,481
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36,591 64,851 69,775 71,776 77,442 83,698
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,435 68,664 70,477 72,513 82,134
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67,728 69,581 71,128 76,954
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,216 68,440 70,491 75,411
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,662 69,104 74,672
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,863 73,389
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42,344
total 107,218 144,440 195,960 278,308 312,687 328,522 363,508 386,879 394,543 423,086 435,160 458,726 474,710 500,629 507,119 512,678 544,083
Table 4: Size of the database, by year and observed worker age
1
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Another check on the dataset was conducted by tracking those workers who were
actually observed in employment in 1987. Table 5 reports the share of individuals
observed working in subsequent years, separately for each age. In the following
year, 1988, around 70% of the workers were still observed employed, a percentage
that is however lower for the group that reached the age of 20 or 21 and was thus
hit by the compulsory military draft (in this case, the values are 66% and 63%,
respectively). Other than the military draft, a wide array of factors could lead to
dropping out of the database in a particular year: unemployment, which reached
13% for young workers in 1988 (UNData, 2009)13; having joined an uncovered
sector (public administration, in particular14); having gone back to school15. A
look at the gender of those not tracked matches what one would expect given the
factors that are more likely to pull this set of workers out of employment. Indeed, it
is predominantly males, affected by the military draft, who are not tracked in 1988
and 1989.16 The dataset also translates with remarkable accuracy the declining
unemployment rate between 1996 and 2000 (from 7.3% to 4.0%, referring now to
the overall active population), as it reports an increase in the share of workers
under analysis who is captured back in employment.17
Even though the focus of the current study is by no means the impact of an
increase in the minimum wage on employment, the current population sizes have
been checked for consistency with the work by Portugal and Cardoso (2006) on the
same data set. Despite the different requirements imposed for sample selection (in
Portugal and Cardoso, just the age variable was of concern and thoroughly checked,
while here more stringent requirements were imposed on education, gender and
the worker identification code), the figures are consistent across the two studies,
as employment growth between 1988 and 1989 was sharpest for the age group 17
to 19 years.18
13Refering to workers aged 15 to 24.
14Public administration accounts for approximately 15% of total employment in Portugal and during the period
under analysis its employment level increased by an average 15 thousand workers each year (Castel-Branco et al,
2008: 14-15). Admissions necessarily outweighted this figure, to cover for worker retirement.
155% of the workers in the current dataset are observed increasing their level of completed education. In
Portugal, the situation of part-time work while studying is very uncommon.
16Data not reported, available from the author upon request.
17From 1988 to 1992 the youth unemplyment rate also declined, but its effect was partly offset in the dataset
by the military draft that affected workers under analysis until 1994.
18Portugal and Cardoso concentrated the analysis on a narrower set of workers and legislative changes.
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age in
March 1987 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005
14 1.00 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.46
15 1.00 0.70 0.66 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.51
16 1.00 0.70 0.66 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.50
17 1.00 0.70 0.65 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.49
18 1.00 0.69 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50
19 1.00 0.66 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50
20 1.00 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50
Table 5: Share of workers observed in 1987 who are tracked later on
1
3
Gross monthly wages were computed as mw = bw + reg, where bw stands for
monthly base-wage and reg are other regularly paid benefits. Wages were deflated
using the Consumer Price Index (base 2005). Wage outliers19 have been dropped.
In the analysis, only full-time wage-earners were considered, since the minimum
wage is set as a monthly benchmark for full-time work (the database also includes
unpaid family members, owners of the firm in case they are actually working in
the firm, active working members of cooperatives, etc). The final dataset under
analysis therefore consists of 5,161,362 observations on 1,016,866 workers. Table
10 in appendix provides descriptive statistics on the dataset.
5 Trends in teenage wages under changing minimum wage
Figures 1 to 5 plot real monthly wage distributions by year and age.20 To avoid
cluttering more the graphs, vertical lines on the level of the applicable minimum
wage for each distribution have not been drawn. However, it may be helpful to
have these references in mind when interpreting the peaks in the distributions and
therefore table 6 specifies the level of the real minimum wage applicable to each
age in each year plotted.
Year Age Group
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 or older
1987 166 166 166 249 332 332 332
1988 245 245 245 327 327 327
1989 240 240 320 320 320
1991 339 339 339
1992 345 345
Table 6: Real minimum wage, by year and age of the worker (2005 Euro). Source:
Own computations based on Portugal, Dia´rio da Repu´blica, several issues.
19Wages above 10 times percentile 99.
20Kernel density of real monthly wages (2005 Euro) in the range up to 600 Euro, using a common bandwidth
(equal to 10).
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Figure 1: Wage distributions, workers aged 14 as of march 1987. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS.
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Figure 2: Wage distributions, workers aged 15 as of march 1987. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS.
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Figure 3: Wage distributions, workers aged 16 as of march 1987. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS.
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Figure 4: Wage distributions, workers aged 17 as of march 1987. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS.
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Figure 5: Wage distributions, workers aged 18 as of march 1987. Source: Computations
based on Portugal, MTSS.
The graphs clearly show a major shift in the wage distribution when the mini-
mum wage for the age group concerned changes. Indeed, the distributions present
a clear peak at the mandatory minimum wage level and, as a consequence, when-
ever the age or legislation underwent change and the age group was eligible for a
sharp increase in the minimum wage, the distribution shifted, with a peak at the
new minimum wage level. Curiously, in 1987, youngsters aged 16 seem to have
benefited from the increase in the minimum wage applicable to the 17 year olds,
since their wage distribution presents two peaks, one at their minimum wage level
and another at the level enforced for 17 year olds, as if employers had generated a
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spillover effect by treating the two groups as homogeneous.21
The fact that minimum wages had such a bite on the wage distribution would
render more likely that employers look for compensating mechanisms to accommo-
date the change in the legislation. Changes in the wage profile of the workers over
time are a natural candidate, reinforced by the fact that previous work has shown
that employment did not decline for the affected group of workers (Portugal and
Cardoso, 2006).
6 Long-run impact of youth minimum wages
This section tests whether exposure to high youth minimum wages jeopardizes
investment in human capital at young ages, being reflected in lower wages later in
life. One main mechanism predicted by the theory will be tested, which unfolds
into two different channels: firms could, on the one hand, reduce the provision
of firm-specific on-the-job training while, on the other hand, they would upgrade
the overall quality of jobs by providing more general on-the-job training. I will
test the hypotheses that workers exposed to high minimum wages when young
have a flatter tenure-earnings profile, possibly reflecting lower initial investment in
firm-specific training, while on the other hand receiving an overall wage premium,
reflecting more general on-the-job training. When performing the tests, I will
control for the impact of formal investment in human capital by the worker, in the
form of schooling.
The unit of analysis is the worker and the longitudinal dataset includes all the
available observations on full-time wage-earners who were aged 14 to 20 years as
of March 1987.
I start out with a specification of a (log) wage regression where the variable of
interest is the contemporaneous level of the minimum wage, after controlling for
the age of the worker (to capture labor market experience) and the current year
(to capture macroeconomic trends). In the subsequent step, the number of years
of exposure to high youth minimum wages is included among the regressors as a
set of dummy variables. This preliminary specification of the model is therefore:
Wit = β1MWit +
5∑
e=1
β2eEei + β
′
3Xit + εit, (1)
21Due to productivity, equity or whichever other reasons.
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where W is (log) real wage, i stands for the worker, and t for the year. MW is
the log of the real minimum wage enforced for the worker’s particular age and
it captures the contemporaneous impact of the minimum wage. Ee is a dummy
variable equal to one if the worker was exposed during e years in his teenagehood to
a high minimum wage; both alternatives of potential exposure and actual exposure
will be considered, either one ranging from no exposure (the omitted category) to 5
years of exposure. Following table 2, potential exposure is set at 5 years for workers
aged 14 as of March 1987, at 4 years for those aged 15 and at 3 years for those
aged 16 or 17; it is 2 and 1 years for workers aged 18 or 19, respectively; workers
aged 20 as of March 1987 were never eligible to the minimum wage hikes described
and thus were never exposed to high youth minimum wages. Actual exposure
takes into account the worker’s age and year of entry into the labor market and its
coding follows table 3. X includes as control variables a set of dummy variables
for the current age of the worker and a set of dummy variables for the year of
observation. Throughout the analysis, robust standard errors are computed, with
clustering at the individual level, since every individual is observed several times
and the assumption of independence of observations must therefore be relaxed.
The subsequent steps in the analysis concentrate only on the more relevant
measure of exposure to high youth minimum wages —actual exposure —, to ex-
plore the mechanisms that may lead minimum wages into having an impact on
longer-term wages, by bringing into the picture the schooling level of the worker
and the returns to seniority within the firm. A more complete specification of the
model is thus the following:
Wit = α1MWit +
5∑
e=1
α2eEei + α
′
3Sit + α
′
4Tit + α
′
5Xit + υit, (2)
with S as a set of schooling dummy variables, T a set of dummy variables rep-
resenting tenure (years of seniority within the firm), and the remaining variables
keeping their meaning from the previous equation.
To explore the impact of minimum wages on the tenure-earnings profile, the
next step consists on interacting tenure within the firm with exposure to high
youth minimum wages (a dummy variable achieving the value one if the worker
was exposed, and zero otherwise). It is feasible to go still one step further, by
interacting tenure with the number of years of exposure to high youth minimum
wages (instead of just the dummy variable on exposed or not). By keeping tenure
18
and exposure to youth minimum wages as two full sets of dummy variables, no
functional form assumptions are imposed on the relationship between tenure and
wages for the different groups of workers. Note that, unfortunately, in the case
of age such exercise is not feasible and we cannot explore the age-earnings profile
to identify at which point in the individual’s working life a potential premium or
penalty on exposure to youth minimum wages is earned. Indeed, the regression
already includes controls for the age of the worker, the year of observation, and the
contemporaneous level of the minimum wage applicable in each year to workers
of each age. The identification of the contemporaneous impact of minimum wages
relies on its variation within year for different ages (up to adulthood or 19 years of
age), which renders unfeasible further introducing interactions between exposure
to minimum wage and the age of the worker.
The analysis undertaken does not address the unsettled debate on the returns
to tenure (see Mincer and Jovanovich (1981), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abra-
ham and Farber (1987), Topel (1991) and Wachter (forthcoming)). While it would
be desirable to account for worker unobserved quality, that is not feasible in the
current setting, as it would wipe out the main variable of interest (exposure to
high youth minimum wages), which is a constant within worker. It should never-
theless be underlined that the current analysis: uses one single method to compare
the returns to tenure across groups of workers; relies on data for which measure-
ment errors are of little concern; imposes no functional form assumptions on the
seniority-wage relationship.
Table 7 reports the main results using potential exposure and table 8 reports
the main results with actual exposure to high youth minimum wages. Tables 11
and 12 in appendix list an extended set of estimates.
Table 7: Wage regressions (using potential exposure to youth minimum
wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minimum wage (log) .211 .197 .215 .207 .211
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Potential exposure
1 year -.008 -.010 -.008 -.006
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
2 years -.010 -.018 -.015 -.012
(.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
3 years -.010 -.030 -.026 -.022
(.004)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
4 years -.003 -.038 -.032 -.028
(.006) (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Continues on next page...
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... table 7 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5 years -.003 -.042 -.035 -.031
(.006) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .028 .019 .041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .099 .088 .118
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .250 .250 .279
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
high school .467 .466 .516
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
university 1.030 1.044 1.095
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Female -.220
(.0007)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Age (dummies) yes yes yes yes
Tenure (dummies) yes yes
Const. 4.226 4.300 4.185 4.200 4.245
(.039)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗
Obs. 5161362 5161362 5161362 5118561 5118561
R
2 .212 .212 .49 .502 .545
F statistic 23333.66 20858.71 28659.08 20118.76 20012.06
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%.
Column 1 considers simply the contemporaneous effect of the legal minimum
wage on workers’ wages and time dummies. The estimated elasticity of wages with
respect to the minimum wage is 0.21 and, interestingly, macroeconomic forces cap-
tured by the time dummy variables and the contemporaneous level of the minimum
wage already account for 21% of the variation of wages across these individuals,
reflecting the relevance of the minimum wage for the population under analysis.
Column 2 further introduces the number of years of potential exposure to high
youth minimum wages among the explanatory variables, to capture the long-term
impact of minimum wages. This preliminary result would suggest that longer ex-
posure to minimum wages during youth is associated with lower wages later in life,
even though the impact is not statistically significant for longer exposures (4 or
5 years). The negative impact of potential exposure to youth minimum wages is
reinforced after the introduction of controls for the worker’s schooling level. That
is understandable, given that younger cohorts have higher schooling levels and
higher potential exposure (i.e. eligibility) to youth minimum wages; the omission
of schooling, which has a positive impact on wages and is positively correlated with
exposure, leads to an upward bias in the estimation of the coefficients on expo-
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sure in column 2. After controlling for the contemporaneous impact of minimum
wages and worker’s education level, one year of potential exposure to high youth
minimum wages would reduce wages by 1%, and two, three, four or five years of
potential exposure would reduce wages by 1.8%, 3%, 3.8% and 4.2%, respectively.
Column 3 also reports high returns to university education, consistent with previ-
ous studies on the issue (see for example Machado and Mata (2001) and Pereira
and Martins (2002)). The results on potential exposure to minimum wages are
also robust to the inclusion of the seniority of the worker among the regressors
(column 4) and when allowing wages to differ between males and females (column
5). In this final specification in table 7, the negative impact of potential exposure
to high youth minimum wages ranges from 0.6% for workers exposed for one year
to 3.1% for workers exposed for five years. Results on both the elasticity and the
negative impact of potential exposure to youth minimum wages on longer-term
wages are in line with Neumark and Nizalova (2007).
A more meaningful concept would take into account, not potential eligibility to
earn a minimum wage, but the actual exposure once the worker entered the labor
market.
Table 8: Wage regressions (using actual exposure to youth minimum
wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minimum wage (log) .211 .176 .209 .209 .191
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Actual exposure
1 year -.133 .039 .020 .012
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
2 years -.168 .047 .024 .012
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
3 years -.188 .057 .029 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
4 years -.207 .070 .036 .031
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
5 years -.211 .080 .040 .041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .021 .015 .039
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .089 .084 .115
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .253 .251 .280
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
high school .475 .470 .518
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
university 1.040 1.049 1.098
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Female -.220
Continues on next page...
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... table 8 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(.0007)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Age (dummies) yes yes yes yes
Tenure (dummies) yes yes
Const. 4.226 4.613 4.102 4.123 4.279
(.039)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗
Obs. 5161362 5161362 5161362 5118561 5118561
R
2 .212 .229 .491 .502 .545
F statistic 23333.66 22073.04 28966.96 20229.63 20139.98
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%.
Results diverge once actual exposure is considered. Table 8 starts out reporting
a sharper negative impact of actual exposure to high youth minimum wages on
long-term wages than when potential exposure was considered (column 2). Column
3 progresses to control for one of the mechanisms that may drive a negative impact
of youth minimum wages on longer-term outcomes. Controlling for the schooling
level of the worker indeed reverses the results, revealing a positive impact of actual
exposure to high youth minimum wages. Again here, the result is understandable.
Individuals with longer actual exposure to youth minimum wages have joined
the labor market earlier in their lives, reducing investment in schooling. Given
that schooling has a positive impact on wages, the negative correlation between
schooling and actual exposure introduces a downward bias in the estimation of the
returns to actual exposure when schooling is omitted from the regression. Once we
control for the schooling of the worker and the contemporaneous effect of minimum
wages, we find that one year of actual participation in the labor market with high
youth minimum wages increases future wages by 3.9% and two, three, four and
five years of actual exposure increase future wages by 4.7%, 5.7%, 7% and 8%,
respectively. That positive link between actual exposure and long-term wages is
robust to the introduction of seniority (column 4) and gender (column 5) among
the explanatory variables. In the final specification in table table 8, the positive
impact of potential exposure to high youth minimum wages ranges from 1.2% for
workers exposed for one year to 4.1% for workers exposed for five years.
The difference in results between tables 7 and 8 stresses that eligibility to earn
a minimum wage (potential exposure) is a misleading proxy for actual exposure to
youth minimum wages, once we aim at evaluating its long-term impact on wages.
The empirical literature on this topic had so far relied exclusively on potential
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exposure, in an analysis moreover conducted at the very aggregate level of cells
defined by state-year-age (Neumark and Nizalova, 2007). The previous results
uncover a link that had not been detected in the previous literature, constrained
as it was by data limitations: as opposed to potential exposure, actual exposure
to high youth minimum wages can have a positive impact on longer-term wages.
To the extent that minimum wages could drive teenagers to invest less in school-
ing, they would have a negative impact on future wages, specially in a framework
of high returns to education such as in Portugal. However, no causal link between
minimum wages and schooling can in the current setting be claimed.
To try to detect the sources of the positive impact of youth minimum wages on
long-term wages, I now explore the tenure-earnings profile of groups of workers who
underwent different exposure to youth minimum wages. First, tenure is interacted
with a dummy variable equal to one for workers exposed as teenagers to high youth
minimum wages. The results are reported in table 9, column 1, and in figure 6,
since a graphical representation of the estimated coefficients on the interaction of
tenure with exposure yields a clearer view of the pattern. The results are striking.
Figure 6 shows a clearly flatter seniority-wage profile for workers exposed to high
youth minimum wages, consistent with a reduction in firm-specific human capital
early in the career, while table 9 reveals a robust wage premium for exposed
workers, consistent with an upgrading of the quality of jobs offered by firms and
an increase in general human capital following the increase in the minimum wage.
The tenure-wage profiles diverge up to a tenure of 13 years, at which point a
worker never exposed to high youth minimum wages earns 12% more than an
exposed worker; at tenure equal to one year, such difference was 1% and at 19
years of tenure it is again down to 6%. After we control for the different tenure
profiles of workers exposed and not exposed to youth minimum wages, we find the
overall long-term wage premium ranging from 5.6% for workers exposed for one
year to 9.1% for those exposed for five years.
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Table 9: Wage regressions with exposure to high youth minimum wages interacted with tenure
(1) (2)
Minimum wage (log) .196 .181
(.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Exposure high youth min wage
1 year .056 .051
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
2 years .058 .062
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
3 years .066 .071
(.001)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
4 years .078 .080
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
5 years .091 .101
(.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .037 .037
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .113 .113
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .277 .277
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
high school .515 .515
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
university 1.097 1.097
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Female -.220 -.220
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes
Age (dummies) yes yes
Tenure (dummies) yes yes
Tenure (dummies) * Exposed (y/n) yes no
Tenure (dummies) * Exposure (dummies) no yes
Const. 4.205 4.270
(.044)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗
Obs. 5118561 5118561
R
2 .546 .546
F statistic 15452.63 8501.562
Note: The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are plotted in figures 6 and 7.
It is feasible to progress considering a finer partition of actual exposure to youth
minimum wages, into a range of one to five years, when interacting it with tenure.
Results are now reported in column 2 of table 9 and figure 7. The pattern reported
in the figure is systematic —the longer the exposure to minimum wages, the flatter
the seniority-earnings profile. Formal tests indicate that the tenure profiles are
significantly different between: workers not exposed to minimum wages and those
exposed for any duration (one to five years) of youth minimum wages22; workers
22With the exception of no significant difference in the returns to tenure equal to 2 between workers exposed
for 4 years and those not exposed, and the returns to tenure equal to 1, 2 or 19 in the case of no exposure and
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Figure 6: returns to tenure for workers exposed and not-exposed to high youth
minimum wages. Note: The regression controls for: worker’s age, schooling, gender and years of
actual exposure to youth minimum wages; the contemporaneous level of the minimum wage and year
(the main estimates are reported in table 9, column 1). The plot coded as “no exposure” reports the
estimated coefficients on the base categories of tenure t; the plot coded as “exposed” reports the sum
of the estimated coefficient on the base categories of tenure t and the respective interaction with the
exposed dummy, so as to yield an immediate interpretation. Returns to tenure in the range 1 to 19 years
are plotted. Source: Computations based Portugal, MTSS.
exposed for one year and those exposed for any other duration23; workers exposed
for two and five years24. On the contrary, a formal test on the equality of the
coefficients reveals that the returns to tenure are not significantly different among
workers exposed for two, three or four years, for most tenure levels. Exposure for
three or four years yields tenure returns that are different from those of exposure
for five years in about half the cases of tenure between 1 and 19 years.25
Table 9 now reports a stronger overall long-term wage premium, rising with the
level of exposure to high youth minimum wages. After we control for the different
tenure profiles of workers exposed for different durations to youth minimum wages,
the overall long-term wage premium ranges from 5.1% for workers exposed for one
year to 10.1% for those exposed for five years.
Even though not all coefficients on tenure are statistically different across expo-
sure levels, the fact that the flatness of the tenure-earnings profile tends to increase
as exposure to youth minimum wages increases, lends some confidence to the re-
sult. Similarly, the overall wage premium rising as exposure increases also suggests
five years of exposure.
23In each case, with two or three levels of tenure as exception.
24With the exception of five tenure levels.
25All these results are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 7: Returns to tenure for workers with different levels of exposure to
high youth minimum wages. Note: The regression controls for worker’s age, schooling, gender and
years of actual exposure to youth minimum wages; the contemporaneous level of the minimum wage and
year (the main estimates are reported in table 9, column 2). The plot coded as “no exposure” reports
the estimated coefficients on the base categories of tenure t; the plot coded as “exposure=e” reports the
sum of the estimated coefficient on the base categories of tenure t and the respective interaction with
the dummy variable exposure equal to e, so as to yield an immediate interpretation. Returns to tenure
in the range 1 to 19 years are plotted. Source: Computations based Portugal, MTSS.
that a relevant pattern has been identified. The current setting does not allow for
a test on whether this wage premium is earned at specific stages of the worker’s
life cycle, since it is not feasible to contrast the age-earnings profile of workers with
different exposure to youth minimum wages.
One criticism that could be addressed to these results concerns the fact that job
mobility has not been taken into account. The analysis of tenure-wage profiles has
implicit a setting of within firm wage growth and one possible reasoning links on-
the-job training at the start of an employment spell with wage progression inside
that firm. That reasoning and the comparison between trained and not-trained
workers would hold as long as workers would stay with the same firm, with the
trained ones reaping the benefits of the firm-specific training received. However,
taking all workers observed at specific moments in time merges workers at different
points in their tenure. A more adequate test would consider only workers observed
since the start of a job spell early in their careers and it would use only information
referring to that job spell. Figure 8 in the text and table 13 in appendix report
the results once the database is restricted to the first job spell we observe from
start (tenure equal to zero) for each worker. The aim of this robustness check is
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to get closer to a test on the returns to firm-specific training.
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Figure 8: Returns to tenure by level of exposure to high youth minimum wages,
first job spell observed from start. Source: Computations based on Portugal, MTSS. Note:
See notes to figures 6 and 7. The main estimates are reported in table 13 in appendix.
All the previous results are reinforced in this new exercise. Table 13 indicates
that the minimum wage benchmark is more relevant in the first job, as the elasticity
of wages with respect to the contemporaneous minimum wage is now above 0.20.
Comparison of the tenure profiles for the overall group (figure 6) and for the
first job tracked from start (figure 8) indicates that wages grow faster in the first
job. Looking just at the first job we still find a steeper tenure-earnings profile for
workers not subject to high youth minimum wages; moreover, the second panel in
the figure still points to an increasingly flatter tenure-earnings profile as exposure
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to youth minimum wages increases, and the difference across exposure groups
is now sharper. Table 13 further reports stronger results concerning the overall
wage premium: workers exposed to youth minimum wages earn a long-term wage
premium, which increases with the duration of exposure, from 5% for those exposed
for one year to 13% for those exposed for five years to high youth minimum wages.
In synthesis, the two major results standing out from the analysis undertaken
are predicted by different bodies of theory. The first pattern, a flatter tenure-
earnings profile the longer the exposure to minimum wages, is predicted by human
capital models and it suggests that investment in firm-specific human capital may
have declined following the increase in the minimum wage. The second pattern, a
wage premium for workers exposed to high youth minimum wages, that moreover
rises with the duration of exposure, is predicted by models of labor market im-
perfections and wage compression, and it suggests that firms may have upgraded
the quality of the jobs they offer and increased investment in the general human
capital of their workers following the increase in the minimum wage.
This pattern is also consistent with the results previously reported by Portugal
and Cardoso (2006) on increased job attachment by young workers subject to high
minimum wages, which could raise their labor market experience, improve their
work habits and professional networks, resulting in higher productivity, though not
brought about by explicit costly training provided by the firm. Moreover, to the
extent that a positive tenure-earning profile can reflect a scheme of delayed pay-
ments, as firms try to reduce shirking problems and prevent quits, the increasing
job attachment associated with the rise in the minimum wage would allow firms to
flatten the tenure-earnings profile. Firms would no longer need to rely so much on
the steepness of the earnings profile to motivate their workers to act in line with
the firm interest (a point explicitly made by Card and Krueger, 1995: 170).
7 Conclusion
Using a remarkable dataset that follows for almost two decades all the workers in
the private sector of the economy, the analysis undertaken enables a clear answer
to the question: Does exposure to high youth minimum wages have a long-term
impact on workers’ wages? Moreover, it allows some hints as to the mechanisms
that may drive such impact.
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After controlling for the contemporaneous impact of the minimum wage (which
translates into an elasticity of approximately 0.20) and the schooling level of the
worker, minimum wages have a long-term impact on workers’ wages, reflected
in: an overall wage premium, consistent with an upgrading of the quality of jobs
offered by the firm and a higher level of initial investment in on-the-job general
training; a flatter tenure-earnings profile, consistent with a lower level of initial
investment in firm-specific training. It is particularly relevant to note that the
overall wage premium increases with exposure to youth minimum wages, just like
the tenure-earnings profile is flatter the longer the exposure to youth minimum
wages. These patterns on the monotonicity of the impact of exposure to minimum
wages on later wages are reassuring as to the reliability of the results.
While it can be argued that the flatter wage profile may be a simple consequence
of higher wages when young —as firms would compensate a higher initial wage
with a slower wage progression, even in the absence of any change in the provision
of on-the-job training —it seems harder to argue why firms would pay a long-term
wage premium to workers exposed to high youth minimum wages, if the type of
jobs they offered or the amount of general human capital they embody in the
worker had not changed. Nevertheless, the analysis undertaken does not rule out
the possibility that, following such a sharp increase in the minimum wage, firms
may have altered their wage policies in more complex ways than predicted when
concentrating only on the provision of on-the-job-training. If adopting a system of
delayed payment or if providing some type of wage insurance to their workers, they
may have changed altogether the phasing of payments over the worker’s life cycle.
Factors such as these may have an implication on wage premia and the tenure-
earnings profile and a more comprehensive model of human capital investment by
the firm following an increase in the minimum wage may be called for.
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Appendix A: Checks on the dataset
Observations with missing or invalid worker identification code26 have been dropped
(6.9% percent of the observations). Whenever gender or date of birth were re-
ported changing over time or schooling was reported decreasing, corrections were
introduced, with the information reported over half the times taken as the correct
one.27 According to this procedure, 0.8 percent, 2.8 percent and 6.8 percent of
the observations in the initial panel have been corrected, respectively for gender,
birth date and education. Workers with inconsistent data after the introduction
of the previous corrections (in particular because no value was reported more than
half the times) were dropped. The whole information on the worker was dropped,
whichever the incorrect number of observations identified: 1.6 percent, 1.1 percent
26For example, the value zero, a sequence of nines, or a code too short.
27Note that this requirement is more demanding than just considering the modal value as the accurate one.
32
and 5.4 percent of the observations, due to inconsistent information on gender,
birth date or schooling, respectively. These figures overstate the dimension of the
problem, given the choice to drop all the worker history. Workers with missing
data after the introduction of the previous corrections were dropped. The share of
observations dropped due to missing age or schooling was, respectively, 0.4 percent
and 1.9 percent of the initial panel. The checked panel with 1987-2005 data on all
age groups included 33,212,289 observations worker-year on 6,288,885 workers.
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics
Table 10: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean or % Std. Dev. Variable % Variable %
Monthly wage (log) 6.418 0.525 Age (years) Tenure (years)
Minimum wage (log) 5.875 0.074 15 0.002 1 0.144
Potential exposure 16 0.006 2 0.114
1 year 0.147 17 0.009 3 0.093
2 years 0.146 18 0.016 4 0.080
3 years 0.283 19 0.025 5 0.067
4 years 0.140 20 0.033 6 0.056
5 years 0.137 21 0.030 7 0.048
Actual exposure 22 0.038 8 0.041
1 year 0.110 23 0.044 9 0.034
2 years 0.086 24 0.055 10 0.028
3 years 0.068 25 0.059 11 0.023
4 years 0.032 26 0.062 12 0.020
5 years 0.009 27 0.065 13 0.017
Education 28 0.067 14 0.013
4 years 0.250 29 0.062 15 0.010
6 years 0.310 30 0.063 16 0.007
9 years 0.144 31 0.064 17 0.005
high school 0.201 32 0.065 18 0.003
university 0.088 33 0.060 19 0.002
Female 0.455 34 0.049 20 0.001
Year 35 0.041 21 0.001
1988 0.023 36 0.036 22 0.001
1989 0.031 37 0.026 23 0
1991 0.044 38 0.016 24 0
1992 0.05 39 0.006 25 0
1993 0.053
1994 0.06
1995 0.064
1996 0.065
1997 0.071
1998 0.071
1999 0.075
2000 0.075
2002 0.074
2003 0.074
2004 0.075
2005 0.078
N=5,161,362
33
Appendix C: Additional tables
Table 11: Wage regressions (using potential exposure to youth minimum
wage), extended set of estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minimum wage (log) .211 .197 .215 .207 .211
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Potential exposure
1 year -.008 -.010 -.008 -.006
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
2 years -.010 -.018 -.015 -.012
(.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
3 years -.010 -.030 -.026 -.022
(.004)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
4 years -.003 -.038 -.032 -.028
(.006) (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
5 years -.003 -.042 -.035 -.031
(.006) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .028 .019 .041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .099 .088 .118
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .250 .250 .279
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
high school .467 .466 .516
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
university 1.030 1.044 1.095
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Tenure (years)
1 .028 .031
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗
2 .056 .061
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗
3 .079 .086
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
4 .098 .106
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
5 .115 .124
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
6 .127 .137
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
7 .138 .148
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
8 .149 .160
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
9 .155 .167
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
10 .165 .177
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
11 .173 .185
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
12 .179 .193
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
13 .186 .200
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
14 .180 .195
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
15 .170 .185
Continues on next page...
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... table 11 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
16 .158 .172
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
17 .150 .163
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
18 .149 .159
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
19 .150 .156
(.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
20 .150 .153
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
21 .157 .153
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
22 .161 .153
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
23 .166 .152
(.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
24 .167 .145
(.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
25 .214 .186
(.035)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
Age (years)
15 .067 .069 .056 .067 .070
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
16 .169 .175 .152 .154 .151
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
17 .254 .263 .230 .227 .218
(.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
18 .344 .358 .304 .296 .284
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
19 .413 .426 .357 .343 .332
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
20 .463 .475 .385 .367 .363
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
21 .498 .510 .399 .378 .387
(.011)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
22 .547 .560 .431 .409 .406
(.011)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
23 .594 .607 .459 .436 .428
(.011)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
24 .640 .652 .481 .455 .446
(.011)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
25 .684 .696 .505 .476 .467
(.011)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
26 .722 .734 .529 .496 .486
(.011)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
27 .753 .766 .552 .515 .504
(.011)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
28 .776 .789 .574 .532 .521
(.011)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗
29 .794 .808 .595 .550 .539
(.011)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
30 .806 .819 .612 .564 .553
(.011)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
31 .815 .827 .629 .578 .567
(.011)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
32 .822 .835 .643 .591 .579
(.011)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Continues on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
33 .825 .838 .657 .602 .591
(.011)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
34 .825 .839 .670 .614 .603
(.012)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
35 .823 .838 .681 .625 .614
(.012)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
36 .824 .838 .693 .635 .626
(.012)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
37 .827 .839 .703 .645 .637
(.012)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
38 .828 .838 .711 .654 .647
(.012)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
39 .835 .842 .723 .665 .659
(.013)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Female -.220
(.0007)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Const. 4.226 4.300 4.185 4.200 4.245
(.039)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗
Obs. 5161362 5161362 5161362 5118561 5118561
R
2 .212 .212 .49 .502 .545
F statistic 23333.66 20858.71 28659.08 20118.76 20012.06
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%.
Table 12: Wage regressions (using actual exposure to youth minimum
wage), extended set of estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minimum wage (log) .211 .176 .209 .209 .191
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Actual exposure
1 year -.133 .039 .020 .012
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
2 years -.168 .047 .024 .012
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
3 years -.188 .057 .029 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
4 years -.207 .070 .036 .031
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
5 years -.211 .080 .040 .041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .021 .015 .039
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .089 .084 .115
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .253 .251 .280
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
high school .475 .470 .518
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
university 1.040 1.049 1.098
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Tenure (years)
1 .028 .031
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗
2 .055 .060
Continues on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗
3 .077 .085
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
4 .096 .105
(.0006)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
5 .113 .122
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
6 .124 .135
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗
7 .135 .146
(.0008)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
8 .145 .157
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
9 .151 .164
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
10 .161 .174
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
11 .167 .182
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
12 .173 .189
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
13 .180 .196
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
14 .174 .191
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
15 .164 .181
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
16 .150 .167
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
17 .141 .157
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
18 .139 .152
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
19 .139 .150
(.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
20 .140 .147
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
21 .149 .148
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
22 .155 .149
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
23 .161 .149
(.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
24 .165 .143
(.014)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
25 .213 .186
(.035)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
Age (years)
15 .067 .059 .071 .075 .085
(.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
16 .169 .148 .185 .173 .182
(.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
17 .254 .226 .276 .253 .262
(.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
18 .344 .303 .369 .333 .347
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
19 .413 .344 .437 .390 .402
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Continues on next page...
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
20 .463 .317 .496 .433 .447
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
21 .498 .322 .525 .454 .479
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
22 .547 .354 .569 .494 .505
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
23 .594 .391 .606 .526 .533
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
24 .640 .417 .641 .556 .559
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
25 .684 .448 .676 .584 .586
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
26 .722 .476 .709 .611 .611
(.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
27 .753 .500 .740 .636 .635
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
28 .776 .515 .771 .661 .658
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
29 .794 .524 .802 .686 .682
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
30 .806 .529 .829 .708 .702
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
31 .815 .530 .855 .729 .722
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
32 .822 .529 .880 .749 .742
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
33 .825 .526 .901 .766 .758
(.011)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
34 .825 .522 .922 .784 .776
(.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
35 .823 .516 .942 .801 .793
(.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
36 .824 .510 .963 .820 .811
(.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
37 .827 .504 .985 .838 .829
(.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
38 .828 .493 1.004 .855 .846
(.012)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
39 .835 .486 1.026 .874 .863
(.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Female -.220
(.0007)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Const. 4.226 4.613 4.102 4.123 4.279
(.039)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗
Obs. 5161362 5161362 5161362 5118561 5118561
R
2 .212 .229 .491 .502 .545
F statistic 23333.66 22073.04 28966.96 20229.63 20139.98
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%.
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Table 13: Wage regressions with exposure to high youth minimum wages interacted with tenure,
first job spell observed from start
(1) (2)
Minimum wage (log) .255 .246
(.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Exposure high youth min wage
1 year .050 .041
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
2 years .049 .050
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
3 years .052 .062
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
4 years .060 .073
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
5 years .070 .091
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Education
4 years .041 .041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
6 years .111 .111
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
9 years .259 .259
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
high school .495 .495
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
university 1.066 1.066
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Female -.231 -.231
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
Year (dummies) yes yes
Age (dummies) yes yes
Tenure (dummies) yes yes
Tenure (dummies) * Exposed (y/n) yes no
Tenure (dummies) * Exposure (dummies) no yes
Const. 3.926 3.955
(.068)∗∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗
Obs. 2814379 2814379
R
2 .529 .529
F statistic 9380.391 5125.709
Note: The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are plotted in figure 8.
39
